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oooOooo
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
JEANETTE OSGUTHORPE,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

: Case No. 890219-CA

JERRY OSGUTHORPE,
Defendant/Appellant.

: District Court No. D87-4967
: Priority 14(b)
oooOooo

RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR REHEARING

The Respondent, Jeanette Osguthorpe, through her counsel on
appeal Kent M. Kasting, Esq., of Dart, Adamson & Kasting, petitions
this Court pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals for a rehearing of an issue raised by Respondent in her
brief on appeal based upon the reasons set forth below.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND CERTIFICATION
This Petition is based on the fact that this Court's opinion
in the above matter fails to address and overlooks an issue raised
by Respondent in Point VIII of her Brief.
Counsel for Respondent hereby certifies that this Petition is
brought in good faith and not for delay.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Dr. Osguthorpe appealed the trial court's decision and claimed
at least five errors. Mrs. Osguthorpe responded to each of those
claims of error arguing that each was without merit and further
requesting that she be awarded her attorney's fees and costs on
appeal.

On March 19, 1990, this Court issued its per curiam

opinion affirming the trial court's decision in all respects. The
opinion, however, does not address Mrs. Osguthorpe's request for
her attorney's fees on appeal as raised in Point VIII of her Brief.
A copy of the Court's Opinion is included in the Addendum to this
Petition.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
MRS. OSGUTHORPE IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF HER
ATTORNEYS
FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN
SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDING DR. OSGUTHORPE'S APPEAL
Dr. Osguthorpe's appeal has now been determined to have no
merit.

The trial court's decision was affirmed in all respects.

Point VIII of Mrs. Osguthorpe's Brief requested that this Court
award her her attorney's fees and costs associated with the appeal.

When an appeal is shown to be without merit, the Respondent
has the right to request this court to award her attorney's fees
and costs on appeal. As the Utah Supreme Court properly concluded
in Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978):
However, the defendant argues that
inasmuch as the plaintiff was unwilling to
abide by the trial court's judgment and that
she has been put to the necessity of defending
2

this appeal, the plaintiff should have to bear
the costs thereof, including reasonable
attorney• s fees for her counsel. We agree with
the reasonableness and propriety of her request
[Id. at 906]
See also Ehninaer v. Ehninqer, 596 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1977).
Likewise, the Utah Court of Appeals has regularly been willing
to award a spouse fees on appeal when that spouse is required to
defend an appeal which is found to be without merit.

In Mauqhn v.

Maughn, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989), the wife Paulette, was
required to defend an appeal filed by her husband.
an award of attorney's fees on two basis.

She requested

First, that the appeal

was frivolous and second, that she could not afford to respond to
the appeal.

This court rejected her claim that the appeal was

frivolous, however, accepted her argument that her need justified
an award of her fees on appeal.

In so doing, this Court stated:

Although not particularly well articulated,
Paulette suggests an alternative basis for
awarding her fees and costs incurred on appeal.
She claims she cannot afford to respond to the
appeal and that since the trial court awarded
her attorney fees, we should do likewise.
Attorney fees on appeal may be granted in the
discretion of the court in conformance with
statute or rule Management Services Corp. v.
Development Assoc. . 617 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah
1980). Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-3 (1984)
provides that either party to a divorce action
may be ordered to pay the adverse party to
prosecute or defend the action. This includes
attorney fees incurred on appeal. See, e.g.,
Carter v. Carter. 584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978);
Marks v. Marks. 98 Utah 400, 100 P.2d 207
(1940); Hendricks v. Hendricks. 91 Utah 564,
65 P.2d 642, 643 (1937).
In view of our
affirmance and the record evidence of her
financial need, we exercise our discretion and
award Paulette attorney fees on appeal.
The

judgment

of

the
3

trial

court

is

affirmed. The case is remanded for the purpose
of determining and awarding to Paulette
attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal.
Id. at 162, 163.
See also Richie v. Richie, 123 Utah Adv. Rpt. (Utah App. filed Dec.
13, 1987.)
Here, the record reflects Mrs. Osguthorpe does not have
substantial assets and has a very limited income.

On the other

hand, Dr. Osguthorpe is a successful doctor of veterinary medicine,
has access to substantial assets sufficient to allow him to
purchase new vehicles, pay his own attorney's fees and pursue this
appeal.

Fairness requires that Mrs. Osguthorpe not be required to

deplete her limited assets in demonstrating that this appeal is
without merit. She requests that this court grant her Petition for
Rehearing, award her attorney's fees on appeal, and remand the
matter to the trial court for a determination of those fees and an
appropriate entry of judgment against Dr. Osguthorpe.
POINT II
THE FEES AND COSTS WHICH MRS. OSGUTHORPE
INCURRED ON APPEAL WERE SUBSTANTIAL AND SHE
DOES NOT HAVE THE MEANS TO PAY THEM
The following is a summary of the attorney's fees and costs
which Mrs. Osguthorpe incurred in connection with this appeal:
Attorney's Fees
33.6 hours partner time at $100 per hour = $3,360.00
5.0 hours clerk/paralegal time at $40 per hour = $200.00
$3,560
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Total attorney's and
clerk/paralegal fees
through March 19,
1990,
the date of

this Court's Opinion
and does not include
fees
incurred
in
connection with this
Petition
for
Rehearing.
Costs
Printing - Respondent's Brief

$158.61

Trial and Hearing Transcript

309.00

Total costs

$467.61

Mrs. Osguthorpe received minimum amounts in terms of alimony
and child support, i.e., $150 per month alimony for five years and
$600 per month child support ($150 per child).

She has limited

means to support herself and four minor children. She was awarded
only half of the attorney's fees she requested at trial.
Osguthorpe has paid nothing toward those fees.

Dr.

She now should not

be required to also bear all of the fees necessary to demonstrate
that Dr. Osguthorpe's appeal was without merit.

The record

presently before this court reflects the requisite need to justify
an award of Mrs. Osguthorpe's attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Osguthorpe was the successful party on appeal.

She was

required to respond to Dr. Osguthorpe's appeal and demonstrate that
the trial court committed none of the errors that Dr. Osguthorpe
claimed had occurred. She has limited means to support herself and
her four children and, consequently, she should be awarded the fees
and costs which she has now incurred in connection with the
original appeal as well as the fees and costs she has now incurred

5

in connection with the filing of this Petition for Rehearing and
the

matter

should

be

remanded

to

the

trial

court

for

a

determination of those fees and entry of judgment against Dr.
Osguthorpe for all such fees.
Respectfully submitted this ^ % day of March, 1990.
DARTfy/AD^ISON & JOLTING

'u

tent M. Kastyhg
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify I caused four true and correct copies of the
Petition for Rehearing and/or Clarification to be hand-delivered
to the following counsel of record on the <?P; day of March, 1989:
David S. Dolowitz, Esq.
Joy M. Douglas, Esq.
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal
525 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

Jeanette Osguthorpe,
Plaintiff and Respondent/

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(For Publication)
Case No. 890219-CA

v.
Jerry Osguthorpe/
Defendant and Appellant.

FILED
WARM 1990

Third District/ Salt Lake County
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
Attorneys:

^a^rkofih#court
u*h c*urt * Appeals

David S. Dolowitz and M. Joy Douglas, Salt Lake
City/ for Appellant
Kent M. Kasting, Salt Lake City, for Respondent

Before Judges Garff, Billings, and Davidson.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant/ Jerry Osguthorpe, appeals from the trial
court's findings of fact/ conclusions of law and divorce
decree. On appeal/ he claims the trial court's findings of
fact regarding alimony and child support are unsupported by the
evidence and the trial court erred in allocating the parties 1
resources, failing to award him the gifts his father gave to
him during the marriage/ and requiring him to pay plaintiff* s
attorney fees. We affirm.
The parties were married in 1974 and separated in 1988.
Four children, who at the time of the divorce ranged in age
from eight to twelve, were born as issue of the marriage.
Prior to the marriage/ both parties essentially completed their
undergraduate degrees. In 1974/ defendant began veterinarian
school/ and his father paid for tuition and books. While
defendant was in school/ plaintiff worked as a waitress and
cashier. In 1977/ defendant received his degree and began
working in his father's veterinary clinic. At trial, defendant
testifiedTthat he was a consultant for his father and received
$2,000 per month. Additionally, defendant stated that he

receives $350 per month rental income. After taxes and
business expenses, defendant testified that his net income was
$1/192 per month and his monthly living expenses were
$2,049.60.
Plaintiff testified that she had a college education with
an outdated teaching certificate. She worked as a cashier and
waitress while defendant was in veterinarian school and was a
housewife and mother from 1977 until the parties1 separation.
At the time of trial, she was employed as an insurance claims
processor, earning a net wage of $770 per month. She testified
that she earned $160 from rental property and her monthly
living expenses were $2,027.
During the marriage, defendant's father provided the
parties with $18,500 for a downpayment on their home on Chris
Lane. He also gave them various cash gifts, including a
$10,000 Christmas gift in both 1982 and 1983, a $5,000
Christmas gift in 1985, and a $1,000 Christmas gift in both
1986 and 1987.
The court found that defendants testimony indicated a
net monthly income of $1,192.80, including $350 per month from
rental property. However, based on a review of all the
documents, the court found that defendant understated his
income or was underemployed. The court also found plaintiff
had a net rental income of $160, and a net monthly salary of
$770 due to her employment as an insurance claims processor.
Plaintiff's monthly expenses, the court found, were $2,027.
The court noted that it had received conflicting testimony
regarding whether the parties' tax returns accurately reflected
the amount of money available to meet the family's needs and
found that the tax returns understated the actual net income
available to the parties during the marriage for family and
living expenses. The court also found that plaintiff assisted
defendant in completing his education by working, caring for
the home and raising the children. Based on those facts, the
court ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $150 alimony per month
for a period of five years, and $1 per year for an additional
five year period, or until such time as plaintiff remarries,
cohabits or dies, whichever occurs first. In addition, the
court ordered defendant to pay child support of $150 per month
per child.
With regard to the parties' property, the court awarded
plaintiff the home on Hillrise Circle which plaintiff purchased
prior to the marriage. In addition, plaintiff was awarded
exclusive^use and occupancy of the parties' home on Chris Lane,

subject to defendant's non-interest bearing equitable lien in
the amount of $22,500. The court further found that
defendant's father's cash gifts, including the $18,500
downpayment on the Chris Lane home were intended by defendant's
father as a gift to both parties for their mutual use and
benefit during the marriage. Lastly, the court ordered
defendant to pay $3,939.65 of plaintiff's attorney fees.
I.

ALIMONY

Defendant claims the trial court's alimony award is based
on erroneous findings of fact regarding defendant's income.
Defendant asserts the trial court erred in failing to enter a
specific finding regarding defendant's income and in finding
defendant was undercompensated or underemployed. Defendant
contends that instead of entering an alimony award based on
speculation, the court should have made a finding and entered
an alimony award based on the evidence. He also claims his
alimony and child support award leave him with $442 per month,
an insufficient amount on which to support himself.
Trial courts have broad discretion in awarding alimony.
Davis v. Davis. 749 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988). We will not
disturb the trial court's alimony award so long as the trial
court exercises its discretion within the standards set by the
court. JsL* In determining alimony, the trial court must
consider three factors: 1) the financial conditions and needs
of the receiving spouse; 2) the ability of the receiving spouse
to produce a sufficient income for him or herself; and 3) the
ability of the responding spouse to provide support. Schindler
v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). If the
trial court considers these factors, this court will not
disturb the alimony award unless such a serious inequity has
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Id.
With regard to plaintiff's financial conditions and
needs, the court found that plaintiff had a net monthly income
of $770, received $160 per month from rental property, and had
$2027 in monthly expenses. The court also reviewed plaintiff's
ability to produce a sufficient income for herself in stating
that plaintiff assisted defendant in completing veterinarian
school by working and caring for the house and children. The
court also found that plaintiff has a college education with a
teaching certificate but that her certificate was not presently
renewed. At the time of trial, although plaintiff was
employed, her employment would soon end. However, the court

found that but she is capable of finding good, gainful
substitute employment.
Regarding defendant's ability to provide support, the
trial court found that defendant testified he received $2,000
per month from his employment as a veterinarian and an
additional $350 per month from barn rental. After taxes and
business expenses, defendant claimed to have a net monthly
income of $1,192.80 and monthly expenses of $2049.60. The
court reviewed the testimony and the tax returns of the parties
and found that defendant receives more monthly income than that
reflected on his exhibit. Further, the court found that
defendant is employed by his father and was either overpaid
when he began his employment or underpaid at present. In
determining the amount of alimony to award, the court stated
that defendant has the ability to earn more than his present
income and has chosen to be employed by his father at a lower
salary. Also, the court stated that the tax returns, which
indicated a yearly adjusted gross income of between $15,000 and
$21,000 from 1982 to 1987, appear to understate the parties'
income during the marriage. Based on these facts, the court
awarded plaintiff $150 monthly alimony for five years. After
five years the court reduced alimony to $1 per year for five
years, until plaintiff remarries, cohabits or dies, whichever
occurs first.
We find no error in the trial court's failure to make a
specific finding regarding defendant's income in this
circumstance. The trial court found that defendant was not
being candid as to his actual current income or was
purposefully underemployed. We defer to the trial court's
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. Utah R. Civ.
P. 52(a); Riche v. Riche, 123 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 31 (Ct. App.
1989). Given the evidence in the record, it was well within
the court's discretion to determine that defendant was either
earning more than the evidence indicated or had the ability to
earn more money. We therefore will not disturb the trial
court's alimony award.
II.

CHILD SUPPORT

Similarly, defendant argues the trial court erred in
awarding plaintiff monthly child support of $150 per child
without entering a specific finding regarding defendant's
income. Defendant claims the trial court failed to consider
all of the factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7 (Supp.
1989) in accordance with Jefferies v. Jefferies. 752 P.2d 909,
911 (Utah-Ct. App. 1988).

Under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1989), the trial court has
broad equitable power to order child support, taking into
account the needs of the children and the ability of the parent
to pay. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985).
The trial courtfs finding of fact will not be overturned unless
they are clearly erroneous. Jefferies, 752 P.2d at 911.
••Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material
issues is reversible error unless the facts in the record are
•clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a
finding in favor of the judgment.1M Acton v. J.B. Deliran. 737
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella v. Bauoh, 660 P.2d
233, 236 (Utah 1983)). Further, section 78-45-7 enumerates the
following material factors that the court must consider in
setting prospective support:
(a) the standard of living and situation
of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the
parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn:
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the need of the obligee;
(f) the age of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for
the support of others.
Jefferies, 752 P.2d at 911.
Defendant claims the trial court erred in failing to make
specific findings on all of the factors. However, the court
made findings regarding the relative wealth and income of the
parties, their respective abilities to earn, and the children's
mother's monthly expenses to provide for the children*s needs.
Further, the evidence in the record indicates that defendant
was thirty-seven at the time of trial, while plaintiff was
thirty-five. Defendant again claims the court erred in failing
to enter a specific finding regarding defendants income.
Without such a finding, defendant claims, the court cannot
determine an appropriate level of child support. We disagree.
The trial court considered the evidence and assessed the
credibility of defendant's testimony. Given the evidence, the
court determined that defendant was either understating his
actual income or had chosen employment which paid less than he
could otherwise earn. We defer to the trial court's assessment
that defendant had an ability to earn more than he purported to
earn and find no abuse of discretion in the court's award of
child support in accordance with that assessment.

III.

GIFTS

Defendant also contends the trial court erred in failing to
award him gifts his father gave to him during the marriage
while returning to plaintiff her premarital property.
Defendant claims entitlement to various cash gifts and an
$18/500 loan his father made available to the parties for a
downpayment on the Chris Lane home. Because defendant's father
testified that the gifts were intended for his son and not the
parties jointly, defendant claims the court should have awarded
him those gifts.
There is no fixed formula for determining a division of
property in a divorce action. Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d
1144, 1146 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The trial court has wide
discretion in adjusting financial and property interests, and
its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity. Ifi.
Absent a showing of a clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion, we will not interfere with a property award.
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
Section 30-3-5 (1989), provides: "When a decree of divorce
is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, and parties." In making an
"equitable" division, trial courts should generally award
property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during
the marriage to that spouse together with any appreciating or
enhancement of its value unless: 1) the other spouse has
contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of
that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it,
or 2) the property has been consumed or its identity lost
through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse
had made a gift of an interest in the property to the other
spouse. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah
1988). However, in making equitable orders pursuant to section
30-3-5, the court has consistently concluded that the trial
court is given broad discretion in dividing property,
regardless of its source or time of acquisition. Burke v.
Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987).
Defendant claims that because the gifts were intended for
him, the trial court erred in failing to award him those gifts
in accordance with Mortensen. However, the trial court found
the gifts were intended for both parties and we will not
overturn the court's factual findings unless they are clearly
erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). The record indicates that
although 'Sefendant•s father testified that the $18,500
downpayment and the other cash gifts given during the marriage
were solely for his son, plaintiff testified that she always

believed the gifts were for both parties. In addition, both
defendant and his father testified that, with one exception,
the gifts were made in the form of checks made payable jointly
to both defendant and plaintiff. The one check that was made
out to defendant only was made at about the time of the
parties' separation. The trial judge stated from the bench
that the past history of gift giving as compared to the gift
given at the time of the separation indicated that defendant's
father intended the previous gifts to be for both parties. In
light of the evidence in the record, the court's finding that
the cash gifts were intended for both parties is not clearly
erroneous. Thus, Mortensen, which sets forth a test for gifts
given to one spouse during the marriage, is inapplicable.
Further, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's
decision not to award defendant those gifts.
IV.

INTEREST

Defendant also claims the trial court failed to award him
interest on his equitable lien on the Chris Lane property
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (1986).
According to section 15-1-4 (1986), all judgments, other
than those rendered on a lawful contract, shall bear interest
at the rate of 12% per annum.
In addition, the trial court in
a divorce proceeding cannot stay statutory accrual of interest
on a judgment for unpaid child support. Stroud v. Stroud, 758
P.2d 905, 906 (Utah 1988). However, an equitable lien, unlike
a judgment, only gives the lienholder a right to collect the
debt out of the charged property. Citizens Bank v. Elks Blda.,
N.V., 663 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1983). A judgment, on the other
hand, is "the final consideration and determination of a court
on matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding." Crofts
v. Crofts, 21 Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d 701, 702 (1968).
The decree awarded plaintiff exclusive use and occupancy of
the Chris Lane home subject to a non-interest bearing equitable
lien in favor of defendant for one-half of the present equity
in the home. The court stated that the lien amount should be
$22,500 and should be paid to defendant when plaintiff
remarries, cohabits, sells the home, moves from the home, or
when the youngest child reaches the age of majority, whichever
occurs first. The equitable lien awarded defendant has not yet
been reduced to judgment. Thus, defendant was awarded an
equitable lien to which interest does not attach under section
15-1-4. We therefore affirm the trial court's award to
defendant of a non-interest bearing equitable lien on the
parties' property for $22,500.

V.

ATTORNEY FEES

Finally, defendant maintains the trial court erred in
awarding plaintiff attorney fees because there was insufficient
evidence of need and reasonableness. To recover attorney fees
in a divorce proceeding/ the movant must demonstrate that the
award is reasonable and that the need of the requesting party
compels the award, Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820, 832
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Factors for determining reasonableness
include the necessity for the number of hours utilized, the
reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the difficulty
of the case and the result accomplished and the rates commonly
charged for similar services in the community. id.
* In this case, there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate
plaintiff's need, given her income and financial
responsibilities. In addition/ plaintiff's attorney profferred
that he had been practicing in the area of domestic relations
law for fifteen years and was familiar with the rates charged
in domestic actions. He also stated that his hourly rate was
$100 per hour and he considered that to be reasonable. He
itemized the rates charged for associates, paralegals and
clerks and stated that those rates were reasonable in his
professional opinion. Plaintiff's attorney reviewed his time
records and estimated the total fee and cost award would be
$7,869.30. The court found that plaintiff's evidence of
attorney fees in the amount of $7,879.30 was reasonable and
necessary. The court further found that plaintiff does not
have the ability to pay the fees and that defendant has the
ability to pay a portion of plaintiff's fees and costs.
Finally, the court found that the hourly rate is reasonable and
consistent with the rate for similar services in the community
and the hours expended were necessary.
In light of the evidence in the record, we find sufficient
evidence of reasonableness and need regarding the attorney
fees. Accordingly, we affirm the award of attorney fees.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge
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